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AN OBJECTION TO SWINBURNE'S
ARGUMENT FOR DUALISM
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann

In various places Richard Swinburne has presented and defended an
argument for Cartesian dualism.! His argument has been discussed
extensively in the literature, and he has recently offered a defense of it
against several of the published objections. 2 But we think that
Swinburne's argument invites an objection that has not yet been raised
in the literature and is fatal to the argumenU
Swinburne's argument was originally designed to prove the conclusion 'I have a soul in 1984', and we will leave it in that form to begin
with. It uses four abbreviations:
p = 'I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984'
q = 'My body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984'
r = 'I have a soul in 1984'
s = 'I exist in 1985'.
Let the variable x range over all consistent propositions that (a) are compatible with the conjunction of p and q and that (b) describe only 1984
states of affairs: Swinburne then offers these three premisses:

l.p
2. (x) 0 (p & q & x & s)
3. -0 (p & q & -r & s)

From premisses 2 and 3, Swinburne says, it follows that -r is not within
the range of x. But, since -r does describe only 1984 states of affairs and
so satisfies restriction (b) on x, -r must violate restriction (a): -r must be
incompatible with (p & q). Therefore, (p & q) entails r. "But the addition to p of q, which describes what happens to my body at the end of
1984[,] can hardly affect whether or not p entails r./I And so, Swinburne
concludes, "p by itself entails r. Hence, from Premiss 1, r/l5-i.e., that I
am a conscious person existing in 1984 entails that I have a soul in 1984.
No argument for one's having a soul could look more elegant.
Many of the objections that have been raised against this argument
have been fairly sophisticated complaints against premiss 2, claiming, for
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instance, that Swinburne equivocates between de re and de dicto readings
of the premiss, a charge he vehemently denies. But we think premiss 2
presents a more fundamental problem that hasn't yet been recognized.
In the case presented by Swinburne's argument, a person who is conscious in 1984 has his body totally destroyed at the last instant of 1984
and nonetheless survives into 1985. 6 Now according to Swinburne,
"Premiss 2 says that it is possible that [s] I survive into 1985, given that
[p] I am conscious in 1984, even if [q] my body is totally destroyed [in
the last instant of 1984] and [x] whatever else might be the case in 1984,
compatible with these last two suppositions."7
But is that possible? Consider, for instance, this substitution for x:
xl

= 'God destroys my soul at the last instant of 1984'.~

xl certainly appears to meet the restrictions on x: (b) it describes only a
1984 state of affairs, and (a) it is compatible with (p & q). But, contrary
to premiss 2, it is not possible that p and q and s and xl. And so it looks
as if the introduction of xl constitutes a counter-example to premiss 2.
Furthermore, xl is by no means unique. 9 Any of the following examples, among others, would have the same result:
x2 = 'I cease to exist at the last instant of 1984'
x3 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of my existence'
x4 = 'The last instant of 1984 is the last instant of time'.
Consequently, premiss 2 looks false.
It might at first glance seem easy to protect premiss 2 against this sort
of counter-example. xl (like our other examples of substitutions for x
that falsify the premiss) is compatible with (p & q) but not with s. So
someone might suppose that the problem we're introducing could be
easily solved by adding a third restriction on x: that (c) any substitution
for x must also be compatible with s. Then, it seems, all our destructive
substitutions for x will be ruled out, and premiss 2 will have been protected against our kind of counter-example.
However, introducing restriction (c) renders Swinburne's argument
invalid. With restriction (c) in force, when we recognize that -r isn't in
the range of x, that will be because -r is incompatible with the conjunction of the three propositions p and q and s. So in that case it won't follow
that -r is incompatible with just (p & q), and so it won't be the case that
(p & q) entails r.
Consequently, either the argument is unsound because premiss 2 is
false, or the argument is invalid.
Furthermore, although the argument's validity could be salvaged by
reformulating it so that it maintains that -r is incompatible with (p & q &
s), the reformulation would render the argument useless for
Swinburne's purposes. A conclusion that p and q and s entail r, or that a
world in which p, q, and s are all true is also a world in which r is true,lIl
would come as no news to philosophical readers, whether or not they
would accept it. An argument to that conclusion would be an argument
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for dualism that couldn't, or shouldn't, produce a qualm in even a very
nervous materialist.
In correspondence with us Swinburne has responded to our objection
by denying that xl (or any proposition relevantly like it) meets his
restrictions on substitutions for x: "Any proposition which affirms that
something existed throughout 1984 and then ceased to exist, which is
entailed by [your] ... [x2] and ... [x3], clearly involves an entailment about
a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then. So [x2] and [x3]
are ruled out as fillings for X."ll And, of course, something similar can
be said about xl: it, too, entails a hard fact about 1985. As for x4,
Swinburne denies that it is logically possible for time to end, and so he
takes x4 to be ruled out by his restricting substitutions for x to consistent
propositions.
Not everyone would agree, of course, that it is logically impossible for
time to end. Without a convincing argument to support this strong claim
of his, premiss 2 is left vulnerable to a counter-example founded on x4.
But because we don't want to discuss Swinburne's view about the necessity of endless time, we're going to leave x4 out of consideration.
But what about Swinburne's reason for rejecting x2 and x3 (and xl) as
substitutions for x? He claims that these substitutions are ruled out by
his original restrictions because each of them "involves an entailment
about a hard fact in 1985, viz., that there is no such thing then" -i.e., that
there is no such thing as me in 1985. So his defense against our counterexample amounts to this claim:
(RS) Any proposition that involves an entailment about a hard
fact in 1985 violates restriction (b) on substitutions for x, that
they describe only 1984 states of affairs.
The fact that Swinburne is committed to this claim helps explain why
the sort of objection we're raising against premiss 2 didn't worry him as
he was formulating his argument. All our counter-examples to premiss
2 are substitutions for x that are compatible with p and q but not with s.
As we've said, such counter-examples might be warded off by adding
restriction (c), that substitutions for x must be compatible also with s,
but that move would vitiate the argument. If, however, claim (RS) is
true, then restriction (c), which can't be added without vitiating the
argument, is already in effect in restriction (b), that substitutions for x
must describe only 1984 states of affairs. Any proposition that is incompatible with s must either describe 1985 states of affairs or entail a
proposition that itself describes 1985 states of affairs, and all such propositions are ruled out by (RS). Part of the ingenuity of Swinburne's argument, then, consists precisely in his having intended restriction (b) in
that way, which allows him to claim that premiss 2 is true without having expressly to admit the possibility that -r is not within the range of x
just in virtue of -r's being incompatible with s.
But is claim (RS) true? Look again at xl: 'God destroys my soul at the
last instant of 1984'. As we've said, it certainly appears to satisfy restriction (b). Swinburne, however, denies that any proposition such as xl
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describes only 1984 states of affairs because, he says, it "involves an
entailment about a hard fact in 1985", namely, that there is no such thing
as me then.
It might be objected that if Swinburne is right about that entailment,
then a claim about my death entails that there is time after my death,
which seems absurd. But of course if, as Swinburne supposes, the persistence of time is logically necessary, this objection would be empty;
and so we won't pursue it here.
Well, then, what about Swinburne's idea that any proposition that
entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985 can't be only
about 1984? We're inclined to think that this is a mistaken way of thinking about what it is for a proposition to be about some particular time
only. It seems to many people that if Fl, a fact about tl, depends on F2,
some fact that obtains at t2, a later time, then a proposition describing Fl
is not about t1 only. But it is not clearly the case that Fl depends on F2
whenever Fl's obtaining at tl entails that some contingent F2 obtains at
t2.12 We think, however, that we don't need to argue with Swinburne
over the general point about what it is for a proposition to be about
some particular time only. For it seems to us that Swinburne can apply
claim (RS) to defend premiss 2 as he does only at the cost of invalidating
his argument.
Swinburne's argument maintains that -r (= 'It is not the case that I have
a soul in 1984') is not within the range of x. And the crux of his argument
consists in his saying that since -r clearly does satisfy restriction (b),
describing only 1984 states of affairs, it's because of its violation of restriction (a)-its being incompatible with (p & q)-that -r isn't in the range of x.
So, given Swinburne's commitment to claim (RS), his argument requires
him to say that -r involves no entailment about a hard fact in 1985. 11
Unfortunately for Swinburne's argument, however, -r entails just the
sort of fact about the post-1984 future that Swinburne himself gives as
an example of an entailed hard fact about that future-"viz., that there is
no such thing then"-since 'It is not the case that I have a soul in 1984'
entails that there is no such thing as my soul in 1985. In the context of
Swinburne's argument, the 'I' of -r is of course identical with the 'I' of p
('I am a conscious person, and I exist in 1984'). We also assume here that
if something has a soul, it necessarily has a soul; but this assumption, or
one relevantly like it, must underlie Swinburne's argument as well.
Otherwise, God could give me a soul at the very instant at which my
body is totally destroyed, and I could thus exist into 1985 even if my
body is destroyed at the last instant of 1984 and I lacked a soul before
then-in which case premiss 3 would be false.
Furthermore, even if we replaced the pronoun in -r and recast the
argument using a proper name-e.g., 'Richard'-it would still be the
case that -r entails a hard fact about the future. We think that 'It is not
the case that Richard has a soul in 1984' entails
(D) Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or
(ii) in 1985 God causes Richard's soul to come into existence and
to exist for some time, however short.
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But for those who, unlike us, suppose that God is contingent and that
souls can just pop into existence without being created, (D) can be
rephrased as (0'):
(0') Either (i) it is not the case that Richard has a soul in 1985, or
(ii) in 1985 Richard's soul begins to exist and exists for some
time, however short.
Neither (D) nor (0') is a necessary truth, since there are worlds (including the actual world, as Swinburne sees it) in which Richard has a soul
in 1985, but it does not come into existence in 1985. Moreover, both disjuncts of both (D) and (0') describe 1985 states of affairs. Given
Swinburne's view that -r is about 1984 only, he must also suppose that
disjunct (i) of both (D) and (0') describes a hard fact about 1985. And,
because we deny (RS), we can maintain that disjunct (i) describes a hard
fact even if we also hold that -r (and propositions relevantly like it)
entail propositions describing contingent facts about the future. Finally,
it seems to us that both (Dii) and (D'ii) describe hard facts about 1985.
Consequently, whether we suppose that -r entails (D) or only (0'), -r
entails a proposition describing a hard fact about 1985. So, if (RS) is
true, then, because -r entails a proposition describing a hard fact about
1985, -r is not only about 1984 states of affairs-contrary to Swinburne's
claim.
In conversation, Swinburne has objected to this argument on the following grounds. First, on his view, God is contingent, and souls can
pop into existence without being created, and so -r doesn't entail (D).
Second, although he doesn't deny that -r entails (0'), he does deny
that (0') describes a hard fact, because of the nature of (D'ii). On
Swinburne's view, (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. Let the
moment at which Richard's soul comes into existence be t. Then (D'ii)
entails that immediately before t that person's soul did not exist. Now on
Swinburne's view any fact about a time t is a soft fact if it entails a hard
fact about any other time, whether earlier or later than t. His view therefore stipulates very stringent requirements for the status of hard fact,
since a fact about t will be a soft fact not only if it entails that some fact
about the future obtains, but even if it entails a fact about any time
before t. Standard examples used to illustrate hard facts will not count
as hard facts in line with these requirements-e.g., Jones wakes up at 8
a.m., which entails that before 8 a.m. Jones exists; Caesar dies at t1 on the
steps of the Capitol, which entails that before tl Caesar is alive; the sun rises
in the east at tl; which entails that before tl the sun does not have the position
in the sky it has at tl. Consequently, Swinburne's requirements for the
status of hard fact strike us as very implausible. For that reason we
reject his claim that (D'ii) describes a soft fact about 1985. And so, even
if we recast Swinburne's argument, replacing the pronoun with a proper
name, and even if we accept his views that God is contingent and that
souls can come into existence without being created by God, on our
view it is nonetheless true that -r entails a hard fact about the future-the
one described by (0').

Faith and Philosophy

410

Therefore, if Swinburne is rjght in supposing that no proposition that
entails a hard fact about 1985 is a proposition that satisfies restriction (b),
describing only 1984 states of affairs, then -r's not being within the range
of x is sufficiently explained just by its violating restriction (b): -r isn't
about 1984 states of affairs only. In that case, it doesn't follow from premisses 1-3 that -r is incompatible with (p & q). And in that case
Swinburne's argument is, again, invalid.
Therefore, viewed from more than one angle, either Swinburne's
argument for dualism is unsound because premiss 2 is false, or it is
invalid.
It is important to us to conclude by emphasizing the obvious: our
arguments against Swinburne's argument don't constitute or even contribute to an argument against dualism generally; there may, of course,
be other, perfectly acceptable arguments for dualism. What's more,
Swinburne is arguing for a Cartesian sort of dualism; but that isn't the
only sort that has been important in philosophy. Aquinas, for instance,
developed a very different, non-Cartesian form of substance dualism. I I
We're inclined to think that Aquinas's version is untouched by the sorts
of objections we raise against Swinburne's argument and also avoids the
standard objections to Cartesian dualism in the literature. Is

St. Louis University
Cornell University
NOTES
1.
Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), Ch. 2, "The Dualist Theory"; Swinburne, The
Evoilition of the 5011/ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), Ch. 8 and Additional
Note 2; Swinburne, "The Structure of the Soul" in A. Peacocke and G.
Gillett, Persons and Personality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Swinburne,
"Body and Soul" in R. Warner and T. Szubka, The Mind-Body Problem: A
Guide to the Current Debate (Oxford & Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1994),
311-316.
2.
"Dualism Intact", Faith and Philosophy 13:1 (January 1996).
3.
We don't mean to suggest that the argument has been or can be satisfactorily defended against the published objections, some of which strike
us as successful.
4.
Swinburne's own version of his second restriction on substitutions
for x is simply "describing 1984 states of affairs", but it becomes clear that he
really means 'describing only 1984 states of affairs', and so we're using (b) in
that stricter form.
5.
"Dualism Intact", p. 69.
6.
Total destruction of the body isn't explicit in q, nor is existing in
1985 expressly construed as surviving into 1985 in s, but Swinburne's use of
these expressions in his subsequent discussion of the argument shows that q
and s are to be interpreted in those ways. See the passage quoted immediately below.
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7.
"Dualism Intact", p. 69.
8.
It is a part of traditional Christian doctrine which Swinburne
accepts that God can annihilate souls. For that reason our xl does not violate restriction (a), that substitutions for x must be compatible with (p & q).
Even on a Cartesian dualist account of the nature of a person, it is possible
for a human person to cease entirely to exist.
9.
In their article "Swinburne's Argument for Dualism" (Faith and
Philosophy 11 [1994], 127-133), William Alston and Thomas Smythe consider
-r itself as a candidate for a substitution for x that would falsify premiss 2.
They acknowledge that "Swinburne thinks that... [-r is] incompatible with
(p.q)", but they note that "that is the conclusion of the argument; it cannot
be taken for granted in a premise" (p. 132). From Swinburne's point of
view, using -r as Alston and Smythe do begs the question against him.
This controversy raises another worry about the argument, one that we
won't pursue here. If assuming that -r is compatible with (p & q) begs the
question against Swinburne, it seems also to beg the question against his
opponent to assume that -r can't be a substitution for x just because it is
incompatible with (p & q). Since materialists would think that -r is compatible with (p & q) and dualists wouldn't, there seems to be no stance other
than neutrality regarding -r's compatibility with (p & q) that doesn't beg the
question in the one direction or the other. If that's the case, then taking premiss 2 to be true is question-begging, too. (We owe this point to Robert
Pasnau.)
10. If temporal gaps in personal existence are possible, then not every
world in which p, q, and s are all true will be a world in which r is also true.
But Swinburne, reasonably enough, denies the logical possibility of such
gaps ("Dualism Intact", p. 73f.).
11. Letter of May 4, 1995.
12. The claims at issue here involve the distinction between hard and
soft facts. For a good review and an excellent analysis of the distinction, see
John Martin Fischer, "Hard-Type Soft Facts", The Philosophical Review 95
(1986),591-60l.
13. On Swinburne's own views it seems impossible for any proposition
to satisfy restriction (b), to be only about 1984. If the persistence of time is
logically necessary, then any proposition at all, including any proposition
ostensibly about 1984 only, will entail that there is time after 1984; and that
there is time after 1984 does seem to be or to include a hard fact about 1985.
Swinburne's way of disarming this criticism is based on his view that all
hard facts are contingent (as he has remarked in correspondence with us).
In that case, (RS) is in effect this: Any proposition that involves an entailment about a hard (and hence contingent) fact in 1985 violates restriction (b)
on substitutions for x, that they describe only 1984 states of affairs. It isn't
clear, however, that it's open to Swinburne to claim that all hard facts are
contingent. According to him, "A hard fact about a certain time is a fact, all
of whose truth-conditions, the states of affairs which make it a fact, are
states of affairs at that time" (The Christian God, p.132). But the proposition
'1985 exists' seems to satisfy this definition, since all the states of affairs
which make it a fact are states of affairs at that time-viz., 1985. Since, however, Swinburne holds that it is a necessary truth that time always exists,
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which entails that there is time through 1985, it's hard to see how he can
hold that '1985 exists' can be contingent. (We're grateful to Sydney
Shoemaker for discussion of these points.)
14. See Eleonore Stump, "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and
Materialism Without Reductionism", Faith and Philosophy 12 (1995), 505-531.
15. For comments on and discussion of an earlier draft we are grateful
to William Alston, Robert Pasnau, Alvin Plantinga, Sydney Shoemaker,
Richard Swinburne, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.

